3 passages · 40 questions · 60 minutes · all reading tests
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You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 1–13, which are based on Reading Passage 1 below.
At about a quarter past seven on the morning of 30 June 1908, people living in a remote part of central Siberia saw a column of blue light moving across the sky, almost as bright as the sun. A few minutes later, there was a flash and a sound that resembled artillery fire. At a trading post at Vanavara, about sixty kilometres away, a man sitting on the porch of his house felt such heat that it seemed his shirt was on fire, and he was thrown several metres by the blast. Windows were shattered, and the shock was recorded by instruments as far away as Germany and Britain. For several nights afterwards, the sky over Europe glowed so brightly that it was reported to be possible to read a newspaper outdoors at midnight.
Remarkably, it was almost twenty years before any scientist reached the area. The region near the Podkamennaya Tunguska river was extremely difficult to reach, with thick forest and swamp, and few people lived there, apart from the Evenki, who herded reindeer. With the First World War and the Russian Revolution, the matter was forgotten. It was only in 1921 that a Russian mineral expert, Leonid Kulik, came across some old newspaper reports, and he assumed that a large meteorite had fallen. He hoped to find a huge deposit of iron, which might be of value to Soviet industry. In 1927, after a long struggle to raise funding, he finally made his way into the forest, using local guides, some of whom were afraid to go any further, since they believed that the place had been cursed.
What Kulik discovered was astonishing. Over an area of more than 2,000 square kilometres, some 80 million trees had been knocked flat, all of them pointing away from a central point. Yet at that centre, where he expected to find a crater, there was none. In fact, the trees there were still standing, although they had lost all their branches and bark, so that they looked like a forest of telegraph poles. Kulik returned on three more expeditions, draining what he believed to be small craters, but he found only a tree stump, and no trace of meteorite material. He was never able to explain the mystery, and he died a prisoner of war in 1942.
The absence of a crater encouraged a great number of theories, some of them highly imaginative. Over the years, the event has been blamed on a small black hole, on a piece of anti-matter, and even on an exploding alien spaceship. None of these is taken seriously by scientists today. A much simpler explanation had been emerging since the 1950s, helped by what was learned from studying nuclear weapons tests. It is that an object from space, between 30 and 60 metres across, broke up and exploded in the atmosphere, between five and ten kilometres above the ground. Such an 'air burst' would explain the pattern of the damage perfectly: the blast would come down from directly overhead at the centre, stripping the trees but leaving them upright, and flattening those further out. Tests carried out using computer models have shown this to be consistent with an explosion a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
Scientists still disagree about the nature of the object. For a long time, it was thought to be a comet, a body made largely of ice, as this would explain why nothing was left behind. Many now favour a stony asteroid, since those are more likely to survive deep into the atmosphere before breaking up, and microscopic particles have been found in the trees and soil of the area that may have come from it. In 2007, a team of Italian scientists proposed that Lake Cheko, about eight kilometres from the centre, might be a crater made by a fragment. However, others have pointed out that the lake appears to be much older than a century, and the question has not been resolved.
For many years, Tunguska was regarded as a historical curiosity. What has changed this is the realisation of how lucky we were. Had the object arrived a few hours later, it could have destroyed a city, as the earth's rotation would have carried a more populated region into its path. Events on this scale are thought to occur only once every few hundred years, but smaller ones are more frequent. On 15 February 2013, a rock about twenty metres wide exploded above the Russian city of Chelyabinsk, and some 1,500 people were injured, almost all of them by flying glass from broken windows. It had not been detected before it entered the atmosphere. Partly as a result, space agencies have put more effort into finding such objects, and in 2022 NASA proved that it was possible to change the path of an asteroid by crashing a spacecraft into it.
1The effects of the event were noticed in other continents.
2Kulik's interest in the event was partly commercial.
3All of the local people were willing to assist Kulik's expedition.
4Kulik wrote a book describing the results of his expeditions.
5Trees at the centre of the area remained upright.
6Most scientists today accept the idea that the explosion was caused by anti-matter.
11Why does the writer say that 'we were lucky' in 1908?
12What caused most of the injuries in Chelyabinsk?
13What was shown by NASA's experiment in 2022?
You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 14–26, which are based on Reading Passage 2 below.
A In September 1944, with Allied troops advancing through the southern Netherlands, the Dutch government in exile called for a national rail strike, to obstruct the movement of German troops. In response, the occupying forces cut off food transports into the west of the country, which was still under their control. Although the ban was partly lifted in November, it was by then too late. An unusually early and severe winter had frozen the canals, so that barges were unable to move food supplies. Official rations in cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, which had been around 1,000 calories a day in November, fell to well under 600 by the following February. People were reduced to eating tulip bulbs and sugar beet, and burning their furniture. About 20,000 people died before the liberation in May 1945.
B As a human tragedy, the Hunger Winter was far from unique. What makes it almost unparalleled for science is a particular combination of circumstances. The famine struck a population which had previously been reasonably well fed, it began and ended abruptly, and it affected some regions and not others. Moreover, the Netherlands kept excellent records. Even in the midst of disaster, midwives and doctors continued to note the details of births, and those records have survived. This allowed researchers to do something that would never be permitted in a laboratory: to compare children who had been exposed to famine at specific stages of their development in the womb with their brothers and sisters, or with others born just before or after, who had not.
C The first major studies, led in the 1970s by the American researchers Zena Stein and Mervyn Susser, focused on military records of young Dutch men, who were examined at eighteen. They found, among other things, that those exposed to famine during early pregnancy had higher rates of obesity, while those exposed late in pregnancy had lower rates. Timing seemed to make all the difference. In later years, as the group grew older, this picture was developed further by a Dutch team under Tessa Roseboom, who studied people born in an Amsterdam hospital around the time of the famine. Babies who had been exposed late in pregnancy were born small, as one might expect. Yet those who had been exposed only early on were of normal weight at birth, and appeared to be healthy, but they went on to have higher rates of heart disease and raised cholesterol in middle age.
D This was a striking finding. It suggested that the effects of a mother's diet could be hidden for fifty years, and that a baby's weight at birth might not reveal them. It fitted with an idea which had been put forward by the British doctor David Barker, who noted in the 1980s that heart disease was more common among adults who had been underweight as babies. His explanation was that a developing child adapts to the conditions that it finds in the womb, in preparation for the world it expects to live in. A body which has been 'programmed' for scarcity may be poorly equipped to deal with the plentiful food of later life. Barker's hypothesis was at first received with some doubt by those who believed that adult lifestyle and genetics were the main causes of disease.
E However, there was still no known mechanism. How could an event before birth have an effect decades later? A possible answer was provided in 2008, when a team including Bas Heijmans and L. H. Lumey examined blood samples from people who had been conceived during the famine. They compared these with samples from their own brothers and sisters of the same sex, who had not been exposed. They looked at a gene known as IGF2, which is involved in growth, and found that it carried fewer of the small chemical tags known as methyl groups. These 'epigenetic' marks do not change the DNA itself, but they can influence whether a gene is active. Six decades after the event, the difference could still be detected.
F This has led to some much more dramatic claims, particularly in the popular press. It has often been said that the effects of the famine have been passed on to the next generation, so that the grandchildren of those who suffered still carry the marks of that winter in their bodies. The evidence for this is much less solid. One study did report that the children of women who had been exposed in the womb had poorer health in later life, but the numbers were small, and later work has not always confirmed this. It is also very difficult to separate biological inheritance from other factors, such as family habits and diet. Nor has anyone shown that the small chemical differences which were found actually cause disease.
G Even with these uncertainties, the Hunger Winter has changed the way that medicine thinks about health. Its most lasting legacy may be a change in where we look for the origins of disease, away from adult behaviour alone, and towards the earliest stages of life. It has also added strength to the arguments for good nutrition for women before and during pregnancy, which is of real importance in many low-income countries today. Roseboom has argued that improving the diet of a young woman may be among the most effective long-term health measures that any government can undertake. It is an unexpected outcome from one of the darkest periods in Dutch history.
14Paragraph A
15Paragraph B
16Paragraph C
17Paragraph D
18Paragraph E
19Paragraph F
20A chemical difference could be found in people many years after the famine.
21Young men's weight was related to the stage of pregnancy in which they were affected.
22Babies may adjust to the conditions they expect to find after birth.
23Governments should consider diet for young women as a long-term investment.
Transport of food was impossible in winter because the 24 had frozen.
Doctors kept details of 25 throughout the famine, and this proved to be valuable.
It is hard to know whether later effects are due to biology, or to things such as family 26.
You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 27–40, which are based on Reading Passage 3 below.
When the Sydney Opera House was approved in 1957, the budget was set at seven million Australian dollars, and it was to be completed by 1963. It finally opened in 1973, on a reduced scale, at a cost of 102 million dollars. Few would now say that the result was not worth it, but as a prediction, the original plan was hopelessly wrong. Nor was it unusual. The Danish planning expert Bent Flyvbjerg, who has collected data on thousands of major projects, reports that around nine in every ten go over budget, and that this pattern has barely changed in a century. It might be thought that the problem is confined to large and complex projects. However, the same mistake can be found on a small scale in almost anyone's daily life.
The psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky gave this tendency a name in 1979: the planning fallacy. They defined it as a tendency to underestimate the time, costs and risks of future actions, even when one knows that similar tasks in the past have taken longer. It is this last point that makes it so curious. Kahneman had his own example. He was once working with a team on a school textbook, and he asked each member to estimate how long it would take. The answers averaged around two years. He then asked a colleague how long similar teams had taken. After a pause, the man admitted that about 40 per cent had never finished at all, and that the others had taken between seven and ten years. The team carried on with their work, and the book took eight years to complete. By that time, the Ministry of Education had lost interest.
In one well-known study from 1994, Roger Buehler and his colleagues asked students to predict when they would finish their final-year theses. On average, they predicted 34 days. They were also asked to say how long it would take if everything went as badly as it possibly could, and the answer to this was 49 days. They actually took 56 days. Fewer than a third of them finished within the time they had predicted, and the average student took longer than even their own worst-case estimate. Perhaps most tellingly, these were the very same students who, when asked, readily agreed that most of their previous assignments had been late.
Why should people repeat such a mistake? The main explanation is that we concentrate on the case at hand. When we plan, we tend to imagine how the task will go, step by step, and we construct a story in which all goes smoothly. We do not include the flu, the broken computer or the colleague who resigns, as each of these is unlikely by itself, even though it is highly likely that something of this kind will happen. When we do think of past failures, we tend to explain them away as being due to special circumstances that will not arise again. It is worth noting that the same people who are so optimistic about their own work are often rather realistic about that of others. Buehler found that observers gave more accurate estimates of how long a student would take than the students did themselves.
Psychological bias, however, cannot be the whole story, and in my opinion, those who treat it as such are being rather naive. In large public projects, there are very often strong incentives to give a low figure. A politician who wants a new stadium, or a contractor who wants the work, knows that an honest estimate may well lead to the plan being rejected. Flyvbjerg calls this 'strategic misrepresentation', which is a polite term for lying. The two explanations are not exclusive, as those who underestimate honestly are more likely to reach positions in which they are making decisions. But to blame it all on human optimism is to let some powerful people off rather lightly.
What can be done? The most effective method, which is known as reference-class forecasting, is based on Kahneman's textbook experience. Rather than asking how this particular project will go, you find out how a large number of similar ones actually went, and you start from that figure, adjusting it only if you have a good reason. It sounds obvious, and yet it requires planners to accept that their project is not special, which they tend to find very hard. Since 2003, the British government has required those preparing appraisals of major public projects to add an 'optimism bias' allowance to their cost estimates, based on past results. I believe that this is a sensible step, although it has an obvious weakness: if everybody knows that the extra money is going to be added, there is less pressure to keep the cost down.
None of this means that optimism has no value. It may well be that some of the great achievements would never have been started if their true costs had been known at the beginning, and the Opera House is the usual example. There is a certain truth in this, but it is a dangerous argument. For every Sydney, there are many projects which have consumed money that could have been better spent. For most of us, the lesson is more modest. When you next have to say how long something will take, try not to think about the task. Instead, think about how long it took the last time. Then, if you are honest, add a little more.
27What is the writer's main point about the Sydney Opera House?
28What made Kahneman's textbook experience so striking?
29What did Buehler's study of students show?
30What is the writer's view of the argument about the Opera House in the final paragraph?
31Large projects are the only ones affected by the planning fallacy.
32It is wrong to explain all cost overruns by referring to psychology.
33Politicians are more dishonest about costs than contractors are.
34The British government's approach is reasonable, despite its limitations.
35Optimism has no useful purpose when it comes to large projects.
When planning, people picture a 36 in which things go well, and they forget that some problem is likely to occur. Past failures are blamed on unusual 37. Interestingly, the estimates made by 38 tend to be better. In the method known as reference-class forecasting, planners use the actual results from 39 projects. This requires them to admit that their own project is not 40.
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