3 passages · 40 questions · 60 minutes · all reading tests
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You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 1–13, which are based on Reading Passage 1 below.
Look closely at an old gravestone, a sea wall or the bark of a roadside tree, and you will probably find patches of grey, yellow or orange crust. These are lichens, and they cover an estimated six to eight per cent of the Earth's land surface, more than is occupied by tropical rainforest. Around 20,000 species have been described. They grow on bare rock in Antarctica and on the leaves of tropical plants, and some of them are among the slowest-growing and longest-lived organisms on the planet. Yet for most of the history of biology, nobody understood what they were.
Early naturalists classified lichens as a kind of moss or, later, as a group of simple plants. It was not until the 1860s that the Swiss botanist Simon Schwendener, peering through a microscope, proposed something that struck many of his contemporaries as absurd: that a lichen was not a single organism at all. It was, he claimed, a fungus that had captured a colony of microscopic algae and put them to work. The algae, which contain chlorophyll, use sunlight to produce sugars; the fungus, which cannot make its own food, consumes a share of those sugars and in return provides a structure in which the algae can live.
The response from leading lichen specialists was hostile. To men who had devoted their careers to describing lichens as independent species, the idea was not merely wrong but insulting, and one of them mocked it as an unnatural union between a captive maiden and a tyrannical master. The image of slavery appealed to Schwendener's opponents because it made his theory sound fanciful, but he himself used similar language, describing the fungus as a master and the algae as its slaves. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century, after researchers succeeded in growing the two partners separately and then bringing them together, did the 'dual hypothesis' gradually gain general acceptance.
The debate had an effect far beyond the study of lichens. In 1877, the German botanist Albert Frank coined a new term for two different organisms living together, and the following year Anton de Bary popularised the word 'symbiosis' in a broader sense. Biologists were beginning to see that cooperation between species might be as important in nature as competition, a view that seemed unfashionable at a time when Darwin's struggle for existence dominated scientific thinking. Even so, a lichen was generally described as an arrangement between one fungus and one alga or bacterium, and for well over a century, this definition appeared in every textbook.
Then, in 2016, a team led by Toby Spribille reported a discovery that made this definition look too simple. Spribille had been trying to work out why two lichens from Montana, one yellow and producing a toxic acid and the other dark brown and harmless, looked so different when the same fungus and alga appeared to be present in both. Genetic analysis revealed a third partner: a yeast, embedded in the outer layer of the lichen, whose quantity was related to the difference between the two forms. Yeasts of this type were subsequently detected in lichens from every continent. Researchers had missed them for 150 years, partly because they could not be seen without special staining, and partly because no one had thought to look.
Lichens' practical importance has long been recognised, even when their nature was not. In the far north, they form the main winter food of reindeer, and they have been used for centuries as a source of dyes and in traditional medicine. More recently, they have become valuable to environmental scientists. Because a lichen has no roots and absorbs almost everything it needs directly from rain and air, it also takes in whatever pollutants those contain, and it has no means of getting rid of them. Sensitive species disappear as air quality declines. In 1970, David Hawksworth and Francis Rose published a scale that allowed the level of sulphur dioxide in English and Welsh air to be estimated simply by noting which species were growing on trees. As sulphur emissions have fallen, many species have returned to cities that had lost them, although others that tolerate nitrogen pollution from traffic and farming now flourish in their place.
They have also proved surprisingly tough. Their ability to dry out almost completely, shutting down all activity until moisture returns, allows them to survive conditions that would kill most other forms of life. In 2005, on a European Space Agency mission, samples of two lichen species were exposed directly to outer space for almost 15 days, enduring vacuum, extreme cold and intense radiation. Once back on Earth, they resumed normal activity within 24 hours.
Slow growth is the price of this endurance. A typical crust-forming lichen may expand by less than a millimetre a year. This feature led geologists to develop a dating technique called lichenometry: by measuring the largest lichen on a rock surface, they can estimate how long ago that surface was exposed by, say, a retreating glacier or a rockfall. The method has limitations, as growth rates differ with climate and location, so that it must be calibrated against surfaces of known age such as dated gravestones. Within these limits, however, it provides a useful guide. It is an unexpected reward for looking carefully at something that most of us walk past without a glance.
1Lichens occupy a smaller area of the Earth's land than tropical rainforest does.
2In a lichen, the fungus depends on its partner for its food.
3Only Schwendener's opponents described the relationship in terms of slavery.
4Schwendener carried out the experiments in which the two partners were separated and recombined.
5The debate about lichens encouraged biologists to give more attention to cooperation between species.
6Spribille began his research with the aim of finding a third partner in lichens.
Practical uses
As a measure of pollution
Survival
Lichenometry
You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 14–26, which are based on Reading Passage 2 below.
A On 26 April 1956, an elderly converted tanker called the Ideal X left Newark, New Jersey, for Houston, Texas, carrying 58 aluminium boxes on its deck. Few of those who watched it depart could have imagined that they were seeing the beginning of a transformation in world trade. The man behind the voyage, Malcom McLean, was not a shipping man at all, but the owner of a trucking company in North Carolina. His idea was remarkably simple: instead of unloading goods from a lorry and stowing them piece by piece in a ship, why not lift the entire body of the lorry on board?
B To appreciate what this meant, it is necessary to understand how ships were loaded before. A typical cargo vessel might carry thousands of different items, including sacks, barrels and crates, each of which had to be carried individually by dockers and fitted into the hold like the pieces of a three-dimensional puzzle. A ship could spend as long in port as it did at sea, and the costs of handling often made up a large part of the total cost of transport. Theft was so common that dock work was jokingly said to pay well only because of what could be taken home. McLean's own calculations showed the scale of the possible savings: loading loose cargo on a medium-sized ship cost $5.86 a ton, while loading the Ideal X worked out at just 16 cents.
C McLean was not the first to think of it, as boxes of various kinds had been used on railways and ships for decades. What set him apart, according to the economic historian Marc Levinson, whose book The Box remains the standard account, was that he grasped that the container was not simply a piece of equipment but the basis of a new system. On this view, the box mattered less as an object than as a way of moving goods. For it to work, ships, ports, lorries, trains and even the contracts of employment would all have to be redesigned. McLean sold his trucking business in order to concentrate on shipping, and he had the engineer Keith Tantlinger develop a corner fitting that allowed containers to be locked to one another and lifted by a crane in seconds.
D Progress was far from smooth. Each company built containers to suit its own routes, so that a box from one firm's ship might not fit on another's. American officials and industry groups spent years in bad-tempered negotiations before agreeing on a set of standards in the 1960s, and these were then adopted internationally by the International Organization for Standardization. Dock unions, seeing the threat to their members' jobs, resisted strongly, and agreements were reached only after long disputes, some of which included guarantees of income for dockers who remained. Many port authorities, for their part, doubted that the expense of new cranes and vast storage areas could ever be justified.
E It was an unlikely event that helped to change their minds. During the Vietnam War, the American military faced chaos in unloading supplies at congested Vietnamese ports. McLean persuaded the Pentagon to let his company try, and containers proved so effective that his ships were soon making regular trips. Rather than return empty to America, they called at Japan on the way home, and picked up whatever Japanese manufacturers wished to export. Trade between Asia and the United States by container thus grew out of what had started as a military contract.
F The geographical consequences were dramatic. Container ports need deep water, huge areas of flat land and fast connections to motorways and railways, and the old docks in the centres of cities rarely had these things. London's docks, once the busiest in the world, had closed by the early 1980s as trade shifted to Felixstowe and Tilbury, downstream or on the coast. In New York, work moved across the harbour to New Jersey, leaving Manhattan's piers empty. Tens of thousands of dock jobs disappeared, along with the seamen's bars, cafés and lodging houses that had depended on them. The waterfronts have since been turned into expensive apartments and offices, so that today few of their residents have any notion of the work that used to go on there.
G The container's largest effect, however, may have been on where things are made. When transport is costly, factories have good reason to be close to their customers. Once it became cheap and predictable, a manufacturer could search the world for the lowest costs, assembling a product from parts made in a dozen countries, and keeping very little stock on hand because the next delivery could be relied upon to arrive on time. It would be wrong to credit the box alone for globalisation, since lower tariffs, new communications and political change all played their part. Economists have nevertheless found that containerisation was associated with a much larger rise in trade than these trade agreements themselves. Today's largest vessels carry more than 20,000 containers, and the journey of a pair of shoes from Asia to Europe may add only a few cents to its price. It is a measure of how complete the revolution has been that almost no one gives this a moment's thought.
14Paragraph A
15Paragraph B
16Paragraph C
17Paragraph D
18Paragraph E
19Paragraph F
20Paragraph G
21What point does the writer make about McLean's use of containers?
22What is suggested about the attitudes of dock unions and port authorities?
23What does the writer say about the role of containers in globalisation?
Before containers, packing a ship was like solving a three-dimensional 24.
Tantlinger's invention, a 25, made it possible for containers to be quickly lifted and secured.
The old city docks lacked the deep water, land and road and rail links that were required, and their sites are now used for 26 and offices.
You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 27–40, which are based on Reading Passage 3 below.
In 1902, the French colonial authorities in Hanoi were alarmed by the number of rats in the city's new sewers, and they offered to pay a small bounty for every rat killed. As proof, a hunter needed only to hand in a tail. The scheme seemed to be working, with thousands of tails coming in every day, until officials began to notice rats in the streets without tails. The hunters had worked out that a living rat could go on breeding, and thus supplying further income, and it was later reported that some enterprising people had started farming rats. The bounty was abandoned, and there were, if anything, rather more rats than before.
The story is often told as a joke at the expense of colonial bureaucrats. I think that it deserves to be taken more seriously, because the mistake made in Hanoi is one that intelligent people continue to make every day. The British economist Charles Goodhart gave one version of the principle in 1975, in a discussion of monetary policy, and the American social scientist Donald Campbell arrived at a similar conclusion at about the same time. It was later reworded by the anthropologist Marilyn Strathern into the form most often quoted: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.
The logic is straightforward. Nobody really wants a certain number of rats' tails; the tails matter only because they indicate something that is much harder to observe, namely how many rats have been removed. A measure of this kind is useful because, under normal conditions, it moves together with the thing we care about. But the moment that rewards are attached to it, people have a reason to move the measure by itself, and the link is broken. It is important to be clear that this does not require wicked people. Most of those who respond in this way are behaving just as the system has invited them to, and some of them may be sincerely convinced that they are doing a good job.
Consider what happened when New York State began, in the early 1990s, to publish death rates for individual heart surgeons and hospitals. The purpose was admirable, as patients would be better informed, and poor performers would be under pressure to improve. Death rates did fall, and the scheme was widely praised. However, when David Dranove and his colleagues examined the evidence in more detail in a study published in 2003, a less comfortable picture emerged. It appeared that surgeons were now avoiding the sickest patients, those who stood most to gain from an operation but who were also most likely to die, and whose deaths would spoil the figures. Healthier patients, meanwhile, were undergoing surgery that they may not have needed. Taken as a whole, the researchers concluded, patients had been made worse off, particularly the most seriously ill among them.
Commercial organisations fare no better. In 2016, the American bank Wells Fargo was fined $185 million after it emerged that employees had opened about two million accounts that customers had not requested, a number later increased substantially. The bank had set staff demanding targets for the number of products sold per customer, and those who failed to meet them risked losing their jobs. To its senior managers, the rising figures had looked for years like evidence of success. It would be comforting to dismiss the affair as simple dishonesty by a few individuals, as the bank at first tried to do, but when thousands of employees in many different branches behave in the same way, it is reasonable to look for an explanation in the system rather than in their characters.
None of this means that we ought to stop measuring things. That would be a foolish reaction, and those who propose it have usually forgotten what it was like before anyone counted. Hospitals and schools that were never compared with one another were able to hide poor results for decades, and many of the improvements of modern medicine were only possible because somebody took the trouble to record what happened to patients. The failure in such cases lies not in collecting numbers but in the mistaken belief that a single number can stand in for a complex purpose, and that it can then be used to reward or punish without further thought.
What, then, should be done? Various remedies have been suggested, and I find some of these more convincing than others. One proposal is to use a larger number of measures at once, so that it becomes harder to improve one at the expense of the rest. This helps, up to a point, but a long list of targets may simply leave people confused about what matters, and clever operators can find ways of satisfying them all. Another is to change the measures regularly or keep them secret until afterwards, which reduces the opportunity for manipulation, though it also makes it hard for people to know what is expected of them, and may seem unfair. Probably the most promising approach is also the least popular with those who run large organisations: use figures as a starting point for questions, rather than as a verdict. A surprising result, whether good or bad, should lead someone to go and look at what is actually happening.
This needs judgement and it takes time, which is the reason why it is so often avoided. A number has the appearance of objectivity, and it protects the person who relies on it from having to justify a decision. Yet if the people at the top will not look beyond their dashboards, they should not be surprised if those below them learn to produce excellent dashboards. Somewhere in every organisation that is run in this way, I suspect, there is the modern equivalent of a rat without a tail.
27The events in Hanoi are more significant than they are generally considered to be.
28Goodhart's explanation of the principle is clearer than that of Campbell.
29People who manipulate a measure are generally aware that they are acting wrongly.
30It was understandable for the New York scheme to be introduced.
31The problem at Wells Fargo is best explained by the personal failings of certain staff.
32Critics who oppose all measurement ignore the benefits it has brought.
33In the third paragraph, the writer says that a measure is valuable when
34What did Dranove's study suggest about the New York scheme?
35According to the writer, the real mistake made by organisations is to
36What is the writer's opinion of the idea of using many measures together?
37Keeping measures unknown until later makes manipulation harder, but it raises questions of ________.
38The writer prefers to see a figure as a reason for further ________.
39This approach is ________ among the people in charge of large organisations.
40Numbers are attractive because they appear to be ________, and so they spare managers from having to defend their decisions.
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