3 passages · 40 questions · 60 minutes · all reading tests
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You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 1–13, which are based on Reading Passage 1 below.
During the winter of 1941 to 1942, while German forces besieged Leningrad and hundreds of thousands of its citizens were dying of hunger, a small group of scientists were barricaded inside a building on St Isaac's Square, guarding what may have been the most extraordinary larder in the world. Around them were many tons of rice, peas, maize and wheat. Several of them died at their desks of starvation, surrounded by food. They refused to eat any of it because these were no ordinary grains, but the collection of the Institute of Plant Industry, built up over two decades by the great Russian botanist Nikolai Vavilov. Their founder was not there to see their sacrifice. He had been arrested in 1940, a victim of Stalin's campaign against orthodox genetics, and he died of starvation in a Soviet prison in 1943.
Vavilov's achievement was as much intellectual as physical. On expeditions across five continents, he collected over a hundred thousand samples of crops and their wild relatives, and in doing so he developed the idea which has guided crop science ever since. He observed that crop diversity was not evenly spread across the globe but was concentrated in a limited number of areas, generally in mountainous regions and generally where farming had first begun. It was in these 'centres of origin', he argued, that plant breeders would find the genetic variety they needed. A wheat that had survived for centuries on a harsh Ethiopian hillside, however poor its yield, might well carry a gene for resistance to some disease which had not yet appeared in Europe.
The significance of this became clear during the twentieth century, when agriculture began to change in ways that placed that very variety at risk. The high-yielding varieties of the Green Revolution, while saving countless people from hunger, replaced the local types which had been grown for generations. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization has estimated that about three quarters of crop diversity was lost between 1900 and 2000, although the precise figure has been challenged, and it is hard to measure what has disappeared. The dangers of uniformity were made painfully evident in 1970, when a leaf blight destroyed around 15 per cent of the American maize harvest, because most of the crop shared the same susceptible genetic material.
The response has been a global network of what are known as gene banks, of which there are now over 1,700, ranging from large international institutions to small national collections. Seeds are dried, placed in sealed packets and stored at low temperatures, conditions under which many species remain capable of growing for decades, or even centuries. These banks, however, have their own weaknesses. Many are underfunded and vulnerable to power failures, while others have fallen victim to natural disasters or human conflict. The national gene bank of the Philippines was destroyed by a typhoon in 2006; those of Iraq and Afghanistan were lost through war.
It was with such risks in mind that the Svalbard Global Seed Vault was opened in 2008. Dug 120 metres into a sandstone mountain on a remote Norwegian island, well above any likely rise in sea level, the facility is intended as a back-up of last resort. It holds duplicates of samples from other gene banks, more than a million varieties in all, at a temperature of minus 18 degrees Celsius, and the surrounding permafrost is expected to keep them frozen even if the power fails. Depositors keep ownership of their seeds, and the boxes are not opened by the Norwegian authorities. The vault is sometimes called the 'doomsday' vault, a name that those who run it dislike, as it suggests that it is only meant for some final global catastrophe.
In fact, the first withdrawal took place in 2015, and for an entirely local reason. The International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas, which had its main gene bank near Aleppo, was forced by the civil war in Syria to abandon its base. Its staff had managed to send most of the collection to Svalbard before the fighting became too severe, and the institute later withdrew samples to rebuild its work in Lebanon and Morocco, returning the fresh seeds to the vault afterwards. Rather than a monument to the end of the world, the vault had worked in the way that an ordinary insurance policy does.
Seeds in storage, however, are not enough on their own. A variety kept in a freezer is cut off from the process of evolution, while in the field, pests and diseases continue to change. For this reason, many scientists argue that it is also essential to support the farmers who continue to grow traditional crops in the field, particularly in Vavilov's centres of diversity, as they provide something that no vault can: a living population which is able to adapt. Climate change has made such efforts more urgent, because the crops of tomorrow may need to tolerate conditions which few modern varieties have ever had to face. The researchers who starved in Leningrad understood that they were protecting something for the future. Eight decades later, we may be only beginning to appreciate how much we will need it.
1Vavilov was in Leningrad during the winter of 1941 to 1942.
2Vavilov believed that the most diverse crops were likely to be found in the regions where farming began.
3Vavilov considered high yield to be the most important quality in a crop.
4The FAO's figure for the loss of crop diversity is universally accepted.
5Gene banks in the Philippines have received more funding than those in Iraq.
6The Norwegian authorities are entitled to inspect the contents of deposited boxes.
The Svalbard vault was built high up, so that it would be safe if the 7 rises. It stores copies of seeds from other gene banks, and they would remain frozen if there was a failure of 8 because of the 9 around it. Its staff do not like its popular name, since it implies that the vault is only for a global 10. It was first used because of a 11 in Syria. However, seeds in a freezer no longer undergo 12, so that scientists also want to help farmers who grow traditional crops, as these form a 13 population that can change with new conditions.
You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 14–26, which are based on Reading Passage 2 below.
A Cholera arrived in Britain in 1831, carried from India along the expanding routes of trade. It was among the most terrifying of diseases: a healthy person could be dead within hours, drained of fluid by violent diarrhoea. Three further epidemics followed, killing tens of thousands of people. The orthodox medical explanation at the time was the miasma theory, which held that disease was caused by poisonous air rising from rotting matter. The theory was not as foolish as it now appears. It was consistent with the observation that disease flourished in filthy, foul-smelling neighbourhoods, and it encouraged sanitary improvements that did, indirectly, save many lives. Its chief defender, the social reformer Edwin Chadwick, sought to remove the sewage from houses, and his 1848 reforms emptied it directly into the Thames, the very river from which much of London drew its drinking water.
B John Snow, a Yorkshire-born doctor who had made his name by pioneering the use of anaesthetics, was among the few to doubt the prevailing wisdom. He reasoned that a disease that attacked the gut was surely being swallowed, not breathed. During the outbreak of 1849 he published a short pamphlet which argued that cholera was spread by contaminated water, but this failed to persuade anyone. Reviewers pointed out, correctly, that he had shown nothing more than a coincidence. In 1854, however, he embarked on a more systematic investigation. In south London, two water companies served the same streets, one drawing its supply from a polluted stretch of the Thames, the other from further upriver. Walking from door to door, he established that households supplied by the first company died at many times the rate of those supplied by the second. It was, in effect, a natural experiment, and a remarkably rigorous one.
C That same summer, a violent outbreak struck the Soho district, close to where Snow lived, killing over 500 people within ten days. Snow interviewed the families concerned, and he came to suspect the public water pump in Broad Street. On 7 September, he presented his evidence to the local authorities, who, though sceptical, agreed to remove the pump's handle the following day. This is the moment that has entered popular legend: the lone scientific hero who stops an epidemic with a single decisive act. Yet, as Snow himself acknowledged, the epidemic was already in decline by then, since so many residents had either fled or died. The removal of the handle may have prevented a further outbreak, but it was not what brought this one to an end.
D The famous map has an equally misunderstood history. It shows each death as a small black bar on the street plan of Soho, clustered tightly around the Broad Street pump, and it is frequently reproduced as the very image of scientific discovery. But Snow did not draw it until months after the event, so that it could not have led him to the pump. He used it to illustrate the argument that he had already made. Its power lay in its treatment of the exceptions. Workers at a nearby brewery, who drank beer, had largely escaped, as had the inmates of a workhouse with its own well. Conversely, a widow living miles away in Hampstead had died because she preferred the taste of the Broad Street water and had it sent to her by cart. It was these details, gathered by patient questioning, that really persuaded.
E An essential contribution came from a man who had set out to prove Snow wrong. The Reverend Henry Whitehead, a young curate in the parish, knew the local people well, and he was convinced that the pump could not be responsible. His own inquiries, which were more thorough than Snow's because the residents trusted him, ended up by confirming the water theory. He also found what Snow had not: the original source of the contamination. It was a baby at 40 Broad Street, whose mother had washed the child's nappies into a cesspool only a few feet from the well. He became Snow's firmest ally, and he remained a defender of his friend's ideas long after Snow's early death in 1858.
F Even so, the official report in 1855 rejected Snow's conclusions, and the pump's handle was soon replaced. The medical establishment took many years to change its mind, as did William Farr, the leading statistician of the day, who had collected some of the very figures on which Snow relied and who initially interpreted them as support for miasma. It was only after an outbreak in the East End of London in 1866, which he traced to a single water company, that Farr became convinced. Robert Koch finally identified the cholera bacterium in 1884, although an Italian, Filippo Pacini, had described it thirty years before without anyone taking notice.
G It is ironic that what finally rid London of cholera had been built for the wrong reason. After the 'Great Stink' of 1858, when the smell from the Thames drove Parliament from its rooms, Joseph Bazalgette was commissioned to construct a vast network of sewers to carry the waste away from the centre of the city. Those who funded it believed that they were getting rid of the smell, and with it the disease. In this, they were completely mistaken about the mechanism, but entirely correct about the result. Snow's reputation today rests upon the method that he helped to create, the science of epidemiology. Its lessons are still relevant: good evidence can be ignored for years if it conflicts with what experts believe, and a fine story often conceals the slow, collective work by which knowledge really advances.
14Paragraph B
15Paragraph C
16Paragraph D
17Paragraph E
18Paragraph F
19Paragraph G
20discovered how a local water supply had originally become infected
21made a discovery that received no attention at the time
22introduced changes that unintentionally made the problem worse
23at first took data as evidence for an idea that was wrong
24Why does the writer say the miasma theory was 'not as foolish as it now appears'?
25What made the study of the two water companies especially valuable?
26What was the importance of the woman in Hampstead?
You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 27–40, which are based on Reading Passage 3 below.
When Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein published their book Nudge in 2008, its central claim seemed almost too good to be true. Human beings, they argued, are not the calculating creatures of economics textbooks. We are lazy and short-sighted, and our choices are heavily influenced by trivial features of the way in which they are presented. Governments could take advantage of this. Without banning anything or spending much money, they could gently steer citizens towards decisions that those citizens would, on reflection, have wanted to make. Such an approach would offend neither those who wanted the state to do more nor those who wanted it to do less. It is hardly surprising that politicians were delighted. Within two years, the British government had set up its Behavioural Insights Team, soon known as the 'nudge unit', and similar bodies have since been established in dozens of other countries.
The early results looked spectacular. In the most celebrated example, automatically enrolling employees in a pension scheme, while leaving them free to leave it, raised participation dramatically. Letters telling late taxpayers that most of their neighbours had already paid brought in millions of pounds at virtually no cost. A much-quoted study by Eric Johnson and Daniel Goldstein found that rates of consent to organ donation were many times higher in countries where people had to opt out than in those where they had to opt in. I do not wish to deny the value of such findings. Many of these interventions were cheap and sensible, and the people responsible for them deserve credit for testing their ideas, which is more than can be said for most government policies.
Yet there are grounds for thinking that the promise has been considerably oversold. In 2021, a widely publicised analysis pooled the results of over 200 studies, and it reported that nudges had a moderate effect overall. Almost immediately, other researchers pointed out that studies with disappointing results are far less likely to be published, and that, once this was allowed for, there might be little or no general effect left at all. A separate examination of the work of two American government nudge units provided a telling comparison: the academic papers showed an average improvement of over eight percentage points, while the far larger trials conducted by the units themselves, all of which were on record whatever they found, showed an average of just 1.4 points. That is still worthwhile, given how little these measures cost. But it is a long way from a revolution.
Even some of the strongest examples look less impressive on closer inspection. Automatic enrolment does get people into pension schemes, but many of them remain at the low contribution rate which is set by default, and there is evidence that some simply borrow more elsewhere, so that their total wealth has grown by much less than the headline figures might suggest. As for organ donation, countries that have changed to opting out have often found little increase in the number of transplants, since families are still consulted at the time of death, and it is hospital organisation that largely determines how many operations take place. Spain, which is often cited as a success for the policy, attributes its high rate mainly to its system of trained coordinators in hospitals.
A deeper objection concerns not whether nudges work, but what they distract us from. In an influential paper of 2022, Nick Chater and George Loewenstein, both of whom were early supporters of behavioural science, argue that the field has made a serious mistake of emphasis. It has concentrated on what they call the 'i-frame', the individual and their failings, at the expense of the 's-frame', the system within which those individuals live. Obesity may be addressed by putting calorie counts on menus, a nudge, or by changing the taxes, regulation and urban design which make unhealthy food so cheap and exercise so difficult. Climate change may be approached by telling households how their energy use compares with that of their neighbours, or by pricing carbon. They note, with some bitterness, that corporations have been quite happy to support the individual approach. It was an oil company's advertising agency, after all, that helped to popularise the idea of a personal 'carbon footprint'.
This seems to me the most serious charge, and it is hard to dismiss. A politician who announces a clever nudge gets credit for action, at no political cost, while an actual tax or regulation would mean confronting powerful interests. There is a real danger that small and cheap measures will come to replace larger ones, rather than supplementing them. It has been found in some studies that people told about a nudge become less supportive of stronger policies, as they assume that the problem is being dealt with. Thaler and Sunstein would reply that they never claimed that nudges could do everything, and this is true. But the claims of those who followed them have often been less careful, and it is the followers' version which has shaped how many governments behave.
None of this should lead us to abandon the project altogether. Forms should be simple, deadlines clear and defaults sensible. It would be absurd to design public services without considering how people actually behave, and the insistence on careful testing is an example to the rest of government. What we should abandon is the fantasy that deep social problems can be solved cheaply, without anyone having to pay or lose anything. Good policy may well involve a nudge. But it will often need a push as well.
27It is understandable that nudging appealed to politicians.
28The people who ran the early nudge programmes should be criticised for the way they tested them.
29An average gain of 1.4 percentage points means a nudge is not worth doing.
30Spain's success with organ donation is more the result of its hospital system than of opting out.
31Chater and Loewenstein's criticism should be taken seriously.
32Governments should employ more economists than behavioural scientists.
33Why does the writer compare academic papers with the government units' trials?
34What does the writer say about automatic pension enrolment?
35Chater and Loewenstein mention the 'carbon footprint' in order to show that
36What danger does the writer see in the sixth paragraph?
37One problem with pooled results is that there is a publication ________.
38Chater and Loewenstein believe that research should give more attention to ________.
39The writer admires the nudge movement for its commitment to ________.
40The writer rejects the belief that serious problems can be solved with no ________.
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