3 passages · 40 questions · 60 minutes · all reading tests
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You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 1–13, which are based on Reading Passage 1 below.
On the afternoon of 14 April 1935, a clear and pleasant Sunday, people across the Oklahoma and Texas panhandles saw a black wall rising on the northern horizon. Within minutes, the sun had vanished, and those caught outside could not see their own hands. Black Sunday, as it came to be called, was the worst of the hundreds of dust storms that swept the southern Great Plains of the United States during the 1930s. Together, they make up what is arguably the greatest environmental disaster in American history. It was not simply a natural catastrophe, although it was certainly triggered by one. To a considerable extent, it was brought about by the people who suffered from it.
The region had once been covered by a sea of native grasses, whose deep and tangled roots held the thin soil in place, and which allowed it to survive both long droughts and violent winds. Early explorers had described the area as a 'Great American Desert', unsuitable for farming. By the late nineteenth century, however, that view had been replaced by something much more optimistic. A series of unusually wet years, along with the promotion of the area by railway companies and land speculators, encouraged settlers to believe that the climate had permanently changed. A popular theory of the time even held that 'rain follows the plough', and that the act of cultivation itself would bring about more rainfall. The Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909 then offered free land in large plots, and people arrived in their thousands.
The decisive period came during and after the First World War. As war disrupted European harvests, the price of wheat rose to record levels, and the government urged farmers to produce as much as possible. At the same time, the arrival of the petrol-driven tractor and the disc plough made it possible for a single person to break up far more land than ever before. Over the next two decades, millions of hectares of grassland were turned over, in what has been called the Great Plow-Up. When wheat prices fell at the end of the 1920s, farmers responded by ploughing still more land, in an attempt to maintain their incomes, and many fields were simply abandoned, leaving their soil bare.
The rains failed in 1931, and the drought lasted, on and off, for most of the decade. With the grass gone and the crops dead, there was nothing to hold down the dry topsoil. The winds of the plains, which had always been strong, now began to lift it into the air. In May 1934, one storm carried an estimated 350 million tonnes of soil eastward for thousands of kilometres, dropping dust on Chicago and darkening the skies over New York and Washington. For those who lived on the plains, life became a constant struggle. Livestock were found dead, with their lungs full of dirt, and many people, particularly children and the elderly, developed a condition known as 'dust pneumonia'.
The federal response was shaped to a remarkable degree by one man, Hugh Hammond Bennett, a soil scientist who had been warning about erosion for decades. Legend has it that in April 1935, as he was giving evidence to a committee of Congress, he deliberately extended his speech, because he knew that a dust storm from the plains was approaching. As the sky over Washington grew dark, he is said to have led the politicians over to the window, and told them that this was what he had been talking about. Whether or not the story is entirely accurate, the Soil Conservation Act was passed later that month, and Bennett was put in charge of the new service which it created. Farmers were paid to adopt new methods, such as ploughing along the contours of the land rather than in straight lines, and leaving crop remains on the fields. Under a separate programme, more than 200 million trees were planted in long lines, to act as windbreaks.
The human cost was immense. Around 2.5 million people left the Plains states during the 1930s, in one of the largest migrations in American history. Their story was made famous by John Steinbeck's novel The Grapes of Wrath, published in 1939. It should be noted, though, that this picture is not wholly accurate. Most of those who left did not come from the worst-hit areas, and many were pushed out of their farms by the general economic depression, or by being replaced by machines. Remarkably, the majority of those living in the very centre of the dust region actually stayed on their land. With the return of the rain in 1939, farming recovered, and the methods that had been introduced did reduce the damage that was caused by later droughts in the 1950s.
Whether the lesson has really been learned is a more open question. Much of the agriculture in the region now depends on water that is pumped from the vast Ogallala Aquifer, an underground reserve which is being used far more quickly than it can be replaced. Climate scientists have warned that the southern Plains are likely to become drier as temperatures go on rising. The Dust Bowl was caused by the belief that a brief period of good fortune was a permanent condition. It would be an irony if the technology that rescued the region were to encourage the same mistake.
1The storms of the 1930s were entirely due to natural causes.
2Native grasses were able to cope with periods of dry weather.
3The first explorers believed that the region had good potential for farming.
4Railway companies gave settlers free transport to the Plains.
5The fall in wheat prices at the end of the 1920s led to a reduction in the area being farmed.
6The dust from the 1934 storm reached the eastern United States.
11What does the writer say about the popular picture of the migration?
12What is the main concern raised about the Ogallala Aquifer?
13What connection does the writer make in the final paragraph?
You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 14–26, which are based on Reading Passage 2 below.
A Intelligence tests have an awkward feature that few people outside the profession were aware of until the 1980s. In order to keep the average score at 100, test publishers periodically produce new versions, and they calibrate them on a fresh sample of the population. By itself, this seems harmless. In 1984, however, the New Zealand political scientist James Flynn asked a question that was surprisingly simple: what happens when you compare how the same people score on an old version and on a new one? He found that people consistently did better on the older tests. The implication was that the standard had been quietly raised again and again, in order to hide a steady rise in performance. In the United States, scores appeared to have gone up by about three points per decade since the 1930s. In 1987, Flynn extended his analysis to fourteen countries, and he found gains in all of them, in some cases much larger than in America.
B The phenomenon, which was soon named the Flynn effect by others, raised a remarkable puzzle. If the gains were taken at face value, the average person a century ago would, by today's standards, have had a score of around 70, which is the usual threshold for intellectual disability. It seems absurd to think that our great-grandparents were barely capable of managing their daily lives.
C A clue to solving the puzzle lies in where the gains have occurred. They are not spread evenly over the different types of question. Scores on tests of vocabulary, general knowledge and arithmetic have risen only slightly, and these are the skills which schools teach most directly. The greatest gains have come on tests such as Raven's Matrices, which ask people to identify the logical rule in a set of abstract patterns, and on 'similarities', in which people are asked what two things have in common.
D A number of explanations have been put forward. Better nutrition is an obvious candidate, as is improved health care, as the removal of childhood disease and malnutrition is known to help brain development. Richard Lynn, a British psychologist, was an early supporter of this idea, and it probably accounts for at least part of the gains, particularly in developing countries, where they are now at their largest. However, nutrition alone cannot easily explain why some kinds of ability have risen so much more than others. Nor can it explain why, in wealthy countries, gains continued for many years after diets had stopped improving. Longer schooling is clearly part of the picture too, since an extra year of education has been shown to raise scores, and the average number of years of education has risen sharply during the twentieth century.
E Flynn's own explanation is perhaps the most interesting. He argues that people today have not become more intelligent in an absolute sense, but that their minds have adapted to a changed world. He illustrates this with the work of Alexander Luria, a Russian psychologist, who interviewed farmers in remote parts of Central Asia during the 1930s. Asked what a fish and a crow have in common, a modern person will say that they are both animals. Luria's subjects found the question strange, and they would answer that one lives in water and the other in the air, or that one can be eaten and the other cannot. They classified objects according to their use in everyday life, and not by abstract categories. Flynn suggests that a century of schooling, of technical work, and of exposure to complex symbols has given us what he calls 'scientific spectacles'. We have not grown stronger minds. We have simply come to look at the world differently, and these are precisely the habits that the tests reward.
F The story has now taken an unexpected turn. In several wealthy countries, the rise appears to have stopped, and in some, it has gone into reverse. The strongest evidence comes from Norway, in which all young men took the same test on entering military service. In a study published in 2018, Bernt Bratsberg and Ole Rogeberg found that scores had risen for those born up to the mid-1970s, and had then started to fall by some seven points per generation. Crucially, they were able to compare brothers within the same family, and this showed that the decline occurred within families as well as between them. This appears to rule out a change in the make-up of the population, such as a change in who is having children or in immigration, and it suggests that the cause lies in the environment. What that cause might be remains unknown, although changes in education and in the use of media have both been suggested.
G What are we to make of all this? At the very least, the Flynn effect is a serious blow to the idea that IQ tests measure a fixed quantity that is largely determined by genes. A trait that can change this much in two or three generations, far too rapidly for any genetic change to be responsible, must be strongly influenced by the conditions in which people live. That does not make the tests meaningless, as they continue to predict success at school and at work with some accuracy. But it does suggest that we should be careful in what we conclude from a difference in scores between one group and another, or between one age and another. Those differences may tell us less about what people are capable of, than about the worlds in which they have grown up.
14an example of how people in an earlier society thought about categories
15a reason why a change in who has children cannot be the explanation for a trend
16an explanation of how the rise had remained hidden
17an implausible conclusion that seems to follow from the data
18a contrast between skills that have changed a lot and those that have not
19An improved diet may have contributed to the increase.
20A fall in scores can be seen among people from the same family.
21Modern ways of looking at the world explain the higher scores on certain tests.
22People with little education grouped things according to their practical uses.
The speed of the change shows that it could not be 23 in origin. This suggests that a person's 24 has a strong influence on their score. Though the tests are not worthless, as they still help to 25 success in education and employment, we should be cautious when interpreting 26 between groups.
You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 27–40, which are based on Reading Passage 3 below.
Science has long prided itself on being self-correcting. The ideal is simple: a researcher publishes a finding, along with the methods by which it was obtained, and others are able to repeat the work to see whether it holds. In practice, this has happened far less often than the public might suppose. Journals prefer new discoveries, funders prefer original projects, and few careers have been made by showing that someone else's result was sound. For decades, it was simply assumed that what appeared in the leading journals was probably true. Over the past fifteen years or so, that assumption has been seriously shaken, in what has become known as the replication crisis.
The warning signs had been there for some time. In 2005, the Stanford medical researcher John Ioannidis published a paper with the deliberately provocative title 'Why Most Published Research Findings Are False', in which he used statistical reasoning to show how small samples, flexible methods and the search for striking results could fill the literature with errors. Then, in 2011, a respected social psychologist, Daryl Bem, published a paper in a leading journal which seemed to show that people could sense events before they had happened. Few believed this. But the study had followed all the normal procedures of the field. If these procedures could produce such a result, what else might they be producing? In the same year, a prominent Dutch psychologist, Diederik Stapel, was found to have invented the data for dozens of papers, and to have gone undetected for many years.
The most systematic test came in 2015. A group of 270 researchers, working together as the Open Science Collaboration, attempted to repeat 100 psychology experiments which had been published in major journals. While 97 per cent of the original studies had reported a significant result, only 36 per cent of the repeat attempts did so, and the effects that were found were, on average, about half the size of those first reported. It would be a mistake to see this as purely a problem for psychology. In 2012, researchers at the biotechnology company Amgen reported that they had been able to confirm the findings of only 6 out of 53 'landmark' studies in cancer biology.
It is important to be clear about the causes, since outright fraud of the Stapel kind is rare. I would argue that the main problem lies not in the dishonesty of individuals, but in the incentives under which honest people work. A researcher's career depends on publication, and journals are much more likely to accept positive results. This creates a strong pressure, of which the researcher may be only partly aware, to find something. With any large set of data, there are many reasonable decisions to be made: which participants to exclude, which measures to focus on, when to stop collecting. By trying a number of combinations, and reporting only the one which gives a positive result, it is possible to find an apparent effect almost anywhere. This practice, known as 'p-hacking', is not generally regarded by those who do it as cheating. Meanwhile, studies that find nothing tend to stay in a drawer, so the published record gives a distorted picture.
The reaction within the scientific community has been mixed, and at times unpleasant. Some of the researchers whose well-known findings failed to replicate have felt that they were being personally attacked, and one senior figure in psychology notoriously described the critics as 'methodological terrorists', though she later withdrew the phrase. Others have pointed out, quite fairly, that a failed repeat does not necessarily mean that the original was wrong. Small differences in the population or the procedure could account for it, and a single repeat may be as unreliable as a single original study. I accept that this is true in individual cases. However, as an explanation for the overall pattern, it seems to me rather implausible, particularly as effects so fragile that a minor change can destroy them would be of little practical use in any event.
Much of the most encouraging response has come from those who have looked for ways of changing the system. One important reform is pre-registration, under which researchers publicly state their hypothesis and their analysis plan before they collect any data, which makes it far harder to adjust them later. A development of this is the 'registered report', pioneered by Chris Chambers and others, in which a journal agrees to publish a study on the basis of its question and methods, before anyone knows the results. There has also been a move towards the sharing of data, and funders in several countries have begun to pay for replication work.
Is science, then, in crisis? I find that word unhelpful, as it suggests a sudden collapse, whereas what we are witnessing is the discovery of a long-standing problem. It would also be a serious misreading to conclude from all this that science as a whole is unreliable, as some opponents of climate science or of vaccines have been quick to do. The fields in which problems have been found are often those in which effects are small and systems complex. Knowledge that has been confirmed many times over, by different methods and different teams, stands as firm as it ever did. Indeed, there is a certain irony here. The evidence that science has been making mistakes has come from scientists themselves, using scientific methods. It may have taken rather longer than it should have done, but this is what self-correction looks like.
27Why was Bem's paper so significant?
28What did the Open Science Collaboration find?
29According to the writer, 'p-hacking' is often
30What is the main benefit of registered reports?
31Deliberate invention of data is the main cause of the problem.
32The system of rewards in science encourages unreliable results.
33Those who criticised original researchers were too aggressive in their language.
34Small differences in procedure are a convincing explanation for the general pattern of failure.
35'Crisis' is a good word for describing the situation in science.
36The findings do not justify a general distrust of science.
Journals and funding bodies have tended to favour research that is 37.
The Amgen study showed that the problem also affected research into 38.
Studies with negative results are often not published, which makes the record 39.
In several countries, 40 have begun to pay for replication studies.
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